This paper examines Vaudenay's privacy model, which is one of the first and most complete privacy models that featured the notion of different privacy classes. We enhance this model by introducing two new generic adversary classes, k-strong and k-forward adversaries where the adversary is allowed to corrupt a tag at most k times. Moreover, we introduce an extended privacy definition that also covers all privacy classes of Vaudenay's model. In order to achieve highest privacy level, we study low cost primitives such as physically unclonable functions (PUFs). The common assumption of PUFs is that their physical structure is destroyed once tampered. This is an ideal assumption because the tamper resistance depends on the ability of the attacker and the quality of the PUF circuits. In this paper, we have weakened this assumption by introducing a new definition k-resistant PUFs. k-PUFs are tamper resistant against at most k attacks; that is, their physical structure remains still functional and correct until at most k th physical attack. Furthermore, we prove that strong privacy can be achieved without public-key cryptography using k PUF-based authentication. We finally prove that our extended proposal achieves both reader authentication and k-strong privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology has benefited increasing attention as an emerging solution for automatically identifying and/or authenticating distant objects and individuals. A typical RFID system generally consists of tags, that is, a microcircuit with an antenna, readers, which allow to remotely query the tags, and a back-end server that manages all the information related to each tag. The tag transfers its coded data when queried by a reader. The reader consigns the packets collected from the tag to the back-end server in order to perform the identification and/or authentication process.
Recently, many technologies based on RFID have been rapidly deployed in several daily life applications such as payment, access control, ticketing, and e-passport. The security and privacy are two major concerns in these applications because the communication between tags and readers runs on an insecure wireless channel.
These concerns are definitely critical points when tags are required to provide a proof of identity. The most conspicuous privacy risk is the tracking of the tag owner that allows the creation and abuse of particular tag owner profiles. Therefore, an RFID system should provide confidentiality of the tag identity along with untraceability of the tag owner even if the internal state of the tag has been disclosed [1] . Besides, an RFID system should be resistant against the traditional authentication and identification threats such as tag impersonation, tag cloning and denial of service attack [2] . Mitigating these problems requires the researchers to design identification/authentication protocols that include cryptographic mechanisms. On the other hand, most of RFID tags have limited memory and computational capability; therefore, the existing privacyattacks on tag's chip allow the adversary to learn the secrets stored in the tag. Thus, the design of a privacypreserving and cost-efficient RFID authentication protocol is a challenging task for industrial applications. To fulfill these needs, several authentication mechanisms have been proposed in the literature [1, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
The design of a privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocols is desperate for a suitable security and privacy model in order to admit of a careful security analysis of the protocol. A large number of frameworks have been proposed to formalize security and privacy in the context of RFID system [2, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . The shortcomings of these frameworks are addressed in [19] , and Vaudenay's model [10] is one of the most evolved and well-defined privacy model. Moreover, Paise et al. [20] extended Vaudenay's privacy model (PV-model), where PV-model additionally offers reader authentication. Later, Armknecht et al. [21] showed that it is impossible to achieve both reader authentication and any reasonable notion of RFID privacy in the PV-model (where the target tags are vulnerable to corruption). On the other hand, Habibi and Araf [22] claimed that the privacy definition and adversary goal presented by Armknecht et al. are completely different from the PV-model, and the highest achievable privacy level in the privacy model of Armknecht et al. is narrow weak privacy.
In this paper, we address two privacy notions of Vaudenay's model: forward and strong privacies. A forward adversary is allowed to corrupt the tag, and once corruption is performed, the system is considered destructed, and now it can use only information of the memory of the target tag. A strong adversary has no restriction on any interactions with the target tag. However, the following attack game is not considered in Vaudenay's privacy model. Assume that an RFID tag is still functional against a number of physical attacks (say k) on a target tag, after k th corruption, the tag is no longer usable. During the period of k corruptions, the adversary can interact with the tags and can still obtain its internal state correctly. In Vaudenay's model, the privacy of such a scenario is not ensured. This is the starting point of our work, in which we define the security and privacy levels between weak and strong privacies.
The strongest achievable notion of privacy in Vaudenay's model, which is strong privacy, entails expensive public-key cryptography. This requirement generally exceeds the computational capabilities of current costefficient RFID tags. In order to achieve the highest privacy levels using only low overhead cryptography, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been studied. In the literature, several PUF-based authentication protocols have been proposed [1, 23, 24] . The security of these protocols rely on tamper-resistant structure of PUF devices, which assumes that an attempt to measure physical parameters of PUF will definitely make it unusable. This is an ideal assumption. However, in the real life, the PUF devices may be usable up to a number of physical attacks. If the PUF is usable after the first successful physical attack, the security of such protocols would be questionable. Therefore, it is not simple to decide whether the security of the system should rely on the protocol or on the tamper resistance of the device. Indeed, ultimate care is required for designing privacy-preserving protocols that the security relies on the tamper resistance of a device. We study these types of PUFs and introduce a new PUF definition, k-resistant PUF, which provides resistance against physical attacks at most k times where the integer value of k depends on the capability of adversary and manufacturing quality of PUFs. We show that the use of k-PUF helps to resolve the aforementioned privacy issues in Vaudenay model.
Our contributions. Our contributions are multiple. We first revisit Vaudenay's model and introduce two new privacy notions, k-strong privacy and k-forward privacy. Namely, we group all privacy classes of Vaudenay's model into two generic privacy classes. With this methodology, we construct a new privacy class between strong and destructive privacies.
In order to achieve highest security levels with only lowcost primitives, we study PUFs. We note that the security of the system relies on the assumption that physically, tampering a PUF will immediately destroy its physical structure and making it unusable. This is, actually, an assumption commonly used in the literature. However, in the real world, this assumption is not always correct because tamper resistance depends on the ability of the attacker and the quality of the manufacture, and the design of the PUF circuit. The circuit may not be destroyed until some number of physical attacks (say k). Moreover, the structure of the PUF might be destroyed when unexpected environmental changes such as voltage, temperature changes occur, and this destruction makes the PUF unreliable [25] . Therefore, we introduce a new extended PUF definition, which we called k-resistant PUF (k-PUF). These PUFs are resistant against at most k number of physical attacks. After the kth attack, the structure of the k-PUF is destroyed and can no longer be evaluated correctly. Also, k-PUF functions are more reliable against the k number of unexpected changes.
To illustrate our new privacy model, we analyzed two recent PUF-based authentication protocols and show their security and privacy levels in our model [1, 3] . We show that these protocols do not achieve k-strong privacy for k > 1.
Next, we propose an efficient unilateral RFID authentication protocol based on k-PUFs. We prove that our protocol achieves k-strong privacy with low-cost cryptographic primitives such as hash functions and PUFs. We also show that when k is zero, 0-strong privacy implies weak privacy in Vaudenay's model, and when k is infinite, 1-strong privacy implies strong privacy in Vaudenay's model. Therefore, to the best our knowledge, this is the first attempt to achieve strong privacy of Vaudenay's model only using symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Finally, we adapt and extend our generic authentication protocol to a mutual authentication. We prove that this extended protocol achieves both k-strong privacy and reader authentication.
Outline of the paper. The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we first briefly describe PUF functions and its characteristics. Then we discuss the problem on the common PUF assumption and give our new PUF definition. Section 3 introduces our extended privacy model. Section 4 introduces two recent PUF-based RFID protocols and analyze their security and privacy levels. In Section 5, we propose a simple generic PUF-based RFID authentication protocol and analyze it with the help of our model. In Section 6, we prove that it is possible to provide both k-strong privacy and reader authentication in an RFID scheme. Section 7 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we emphasize the current PUF function problems and provide an overview of related work and our new PUF function definition.
Physical Unclonable Functions
A PUF is a disordered physical structure implementing a unique function that maps challenges to responses. These responses depend on the nano-scale structural disorder of the PUF that is assumed to be unclonable or not even reproducible by the PUF's manufacturer. Namely, the PUF functions are embodied in a physical structure in a complex way upon several physical properties that the manufacturers cannot control, and they are easy to be computed, but difficult to be predicted, characterized and modeled the mappings.
The first attempt to exploit the physical properties of the devices for authentication purposes was performed in [26] [27] [28] . Naccache and Fremanteau [29] later proposed an authentication mechanism for memory cards, which uses these physical properties. The concept of PUFs is first introduced by Pappu [30, 31] . Their PUF functions were based on an optical principle of operation. In these PUFs, transparent tokens include randomly distributed scattering particles and are illuminated by a laser light with a specific angle, distance and wavelength. The resulted speckle patterns from multiple scattering of laser in an incoherent optical medium are used for unique and unpredictable identifier. The challenge of the PUF can be the angle of incidence, the local distance or the wavelength of the laser. The responses can be hash value of digitized image of the speckle pattern. Afterward, several papers considered various hardware structures of PUF [32] [33] [34] [35] .
Besides, for a given challenge c, a typical PUF P may produce a slightly different response r .r P.c// because the response depends on the physical characteristics that could be affected by environmental noises such as temperature, light and supply voltage variations. This obstacle can be eliminated by a small circuit, called fuzzy extractor and with help of additional help input w [36] . Moreover, even though two PUFs are implemented on the same device with the same structure, they both give independent responses with overwhelming probability for the same given challenges. Armknecht et al. proposed a formal foundation for such security primitives based on PUFs in [37] .
The usage of PUFs in the authentication mechanisms has led to an increase in the security of existing RFID systems. They provide a new way for cost-efficient privacy preserving authentications based on the unclonable physical properties. In [32] , PUFs are shown how they can be used to establish a shared secret with a specific physical device. Namely, PUFs are embedded into a microchip. One of the first attempts to embody PUF functions into RFIDbased authentication protocols is proposed in [38, 39] . In these studies, a set of challenge/response is derived from the PUF for each tag. The challenge/response pairs are stored in a secure database. The RFID reader selects a random challenge from the database and broadcasts it to the environment. Then, the received responses of the tags are interpreted by simply looking up the database. The main obstacle of the scheme is that the challenge cannot be used anymore because it results to replay attacks. Another obstacle is storing huge amount of challenge/response in the database.
Tuyls et al. [23] used PUF functions as secure key derivation mechanism because PUF behaves like a hidden pseudo-random functions. Whenever a key hidden by PUF is needed during an authentication, it is simply derived by evaluating the PUF on the chip. Tuyls et al. assumed that as the adversary tries to evaluate a PUF or an integrated circuit, for instance, by using the probes to measure the wire delays, the characteristics of that particular PUF are changed. Thus, the intrinsic structure of the PUFs yields resistance against tampering, and this reduces the capability of an adversary to clone an RFID tag. Moreover, they also demonstrated that PUF circuit can easily be realized on an RFID chip with less than 1000 gates [23] .
In [40] , another way of using PUF within a privacypreserving RFID authentication scheme was proposed. In this scheme, for each ID of tag, the database of the reader stores the vector˚ID, P.ID/, P 2 .ID/, : : : , P t .ID/ « where t is the threshold for authentication of a tag. Whenever the reader interrogates a tag, the tag evaluates its PUF with its ID. The response is sent to the reader, and the tag updates its ID with this response. The reader simply looks up the database, identifies the tag and removes the used response from the database. The main bottleneck of this protocol is that the system should store a huge amount of data for a large t. It also suffers from denial of service attacks as the tag must be re-initialized after at most t sessions.
Sadeghi et al. [1] proposed a destructive private RFID authentication protocol based on PUF, which is similar to PUFs functions of [23] . Whenever a strong adversary performs a physical attack, such as side channel on PUFs of RFID tags, these PUF functions are destroyed and cannot be evaluated anymore. Later, Kardas et al. also introduced a new usage of PUF functions with a weaker assumption, where the adversary can reach all the internal state of the tags whenever she does a physical attack [3] . They also proposed a destructive private authentication protocol for RFID systems. Furthermore, recently, several k-strong privacy for RFID authentication protocols based on PUFs S. Kardaş et al. new authentication mechanisms based on PUF functions have been proposed in order to enhance their security and privacy levels [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] .
In this paper, we introduce a new PUF function definition (k-PUFs) that are resistant to at most k physical attacks. Contrary to the PUF of [1, 3, 23] , after the k th physical attack on the chip, the PUF inside the tag cannot be evaluated anymore because the structure of the PUF is destroyed with overwhelming probability. Similar to [3] , we also assume that an adversary can reach to volatile and non-volatile memories of the tag in the case of physical attacks.
In this study, we prove that the protocol proposed in [1] achieves 0-strong (implies weak privacy in Vaudenay model [10] ) privacy in our model. Similarly, we prove that the protocol proposed in [3] achieves 1-strong privacy, which implies destructive privacy in Vaudenay model.
Motivation and problem statement
Vaudenay defined several adversary classes that cover almost all of the privacy levels in his seminal work [10] . Nevertheless, the following privacy issues are not considered in the model. Suppose that an adversary corrupts a target tag k times where k is an integer. During (and after) these attacks, the tag is still functional and the adversary can still interact with it, and the privacy of the tag is satisfied. However, after the kC1-th corruption, the privacy of the tag is not satisfied. The security and privacy of this scenario is not addressed in Vaudenay's model. Note that when k goes to infinity, if the privacy of the tag is ensured against such an attack, then the strong privacy of Vaudenay's model is achieved. If k is equal to 1 and the privacy is still ensured, then the destructive privacy of Vaudenay's model is achieved. Similarly, if k is equal to 0, the weak privacy of Vaudenay's model is achieved. However, the privacy levels are not defined in Vaudenay's model in case of k 2. This is the starting point of our work, in which we define the security and privacy levels between weak and strong privacy notions for the first time in the literature.
We would like to highlight that the strong privacy of Vaudenay's model requires expensive public key cryptography. The driving motive behind this paper is achieving security levels of k 1 using only low cost primitives. In this context, we have studied PUF functions and the common assumption on the PUFs. Then, we defined a new generic PUF function, which we call k-PUF. With this new k-PUF function, we show that the security levels described earlier can be achieved. Now, let us look at the assumption. A large body of literature dedicated to PUFs assumes that any attempt to tampering the PUF circuit in order to observe its internal states will most likely alter these variables or even destroy the structure of the circuit [23, 24, 34, [46] [47] [48] . Here, most likely means that in practice, some circuits may stay working as usual after a number of physical attacks. In fact, it depends on the manufacturing structure of the circuit and the ability of the attacker. Therefore, it is a strong assumption to postulate that any PUF circuit will destroy after a single attack. In what follows, we examine this problem and give a more general statement for realistic circumstances by weakening this assumption.
Let p be the destruction probability of a given PUF after a single physical attack. The value of p depends on the attacker's capability and chip's level of strength against the physical attacks. The PUF circuit is assumed to be destructed if p P dest where P dest denotes a threshold value. If p P dest after the first corruption, then the circuit fulfills the best tamper-resistant property that corresponds to the ideal PUF case. More generally, let P.X D i/ denote the event of tag's evaluating not correctly after i-th corruption, then the probability of tag's not evaluating correctly at most k physical attack is
Thus, the tag cannot evaluate correctly if the condition below is satisfied
Note that the basic case of k D 1 corresponds to the ideal PUF. In the next section, we generalize the definition of ideal PUF by extending it to a more realistic sense by allowing limited number of attempts to tamper without destruction (up to a level of k).
A new definition: k-PUF
Let us denote s 2 R S for choosing a value s uniformly at random from the set S. y 2 f0, 1g˛means y is any natural number such that y's bit length is at most˛. For the casę D , there is no restriction on bit length of y; that is, y can be any natural number.
A mapping f : f0, 1g˛! f0, 1gˇmeans that f maps elements from f0, 1g˛to f0, 1gˇ. Pr.E/ denotes the probability of event E occurring. MSB a fkg denotes the most significant a bits of binary representation of k.
We are now ready to present our new definition of PUF as follows: 
Any probabilistic polynomial time adversary has at most negligible success probability to distinguish between output of P k and a random value. k-PUF is resistant against any physical attack at most k times (e.g. invasive attack). Namely, P k cannot be evaluated correctly anymore after k physical attacks.
Practicality of k-PUF
In this section, we are going to provide some intuition about how to create a k-PUF structure. The coating PUF modeled by Tuyls et al. in [47] has a self-destructing capability control where an invasive attack would probably cause to destroy PUF structure. This control detects the attack whenever the level of noise caused by the attack in the output of the PUF exceeds some threshold; so, if not detected, the PUF will not be destructed. If the PUF is destroyed after the first attack, this PUF could be considered as a natural example of k-PUF where k D 1. Our construction of k-PUF is inspired by the aforementioned observation on [47] and is described as follows.
The coating PUF can be built as top layer of an integrated circuit by applying circuit paths and laid out in a comb shape. These paths will be encased by a material that is randomly doped with dielectric particles of different size and dielectric strength. Each pair of circuit paths forms a capacitor with random capacitance, which again is unlikely to be controllable by the manufacturer. Random capacitor allows PUF to give a response with noise for a given challenge. In order to clean the noise from the response (i.e. error correction), helper data algorithm/fuzzy extractor is used for the reconstruction of secret keys [36] . Tuyls et al. [25, 47] showed that coating PUFs are resistant to an adversary who has the following optical and invasive methods.
Optical inspection equipment to look into memory cells. Etching methods (e.g. chemical) to remove protective layers. Focused-ion beam (FIB) to make holes in protective layers and allow for probing (of e.g. memory).
Because the coating is opaque, it is not so possible to look into the digital memory optically without damaging the coating [47] . Tuyls et al. [47] presented an advanced attack on the coating PUF where an adversary uses FIB to make a hole in the coating. The adversary uses his or her micro-probe(s) to retrieve the key bits during the reconstruction phase of the key. The use of FIB and micro-probes might give damage on the PUF. This damage causes the extracted key bits with more noise. It is stated that during reconstruction phase, the extracted keys are checked with a signature. If the level of the noise is very high, then the computed signature would not be valid, and the PUF would be destroyed by the controller. However, the adversary obtains key bits with some noise during the attack. For example, if the PUF produces key length of 128 bits, then the attacker can recover the complete bits with 2 51 trials (we refer to [47] for further details). We highlight that the level of noise in the PUF response is not only affected by the physical attacks but also affected by the unexpected significant environmental changes such as temperature, voltage changes. Thus, this environmental situation makes PUF unreliable.
The proposed k-PUF design is described as follows. We employ an additional counter, which is initialized to zero in the PUF control. The counter enables the PUF to limit the number of invasive attacks applied to the circuit. For example, a similar attack described earlier is performed; the PUF's control would detect the attack, and it increments the counter by one because the attack causes the circuit to produce key bits with higher noise and fuzzy extractor is not able to produce a valid key and the signature would not be correct. When the counter is greater than or equal to k 2, the control in the PUF immediately destroys the circuit. In the worst case, in each attack, the adversary is assumed to recover a different key. In total, he or she can gain at most k 1 different keys, but in the k th attack, the structure of the PUF is destroyed. Hence, the security of our PUF is still protected. Moreover, our PUF functions are also vulnerable to environmental changes, but they are reliable against number of k 1 unexpected changes.
OUR EXTENDED SECURITY AND PRIVACY MODEL
In this section, we first revisit the well-known definitions based on Vaudenay's privacy model [10] . Then, we extend this model by introducing a new class of adversary, namely, k-strong adversary where an adversary has the ability to corrupt a tag at most k times. After that, we introduce our kstrong privacy, which is an extension of privacy definition of Vaudenay's model
Vaudenay's privacy model
In order to clearly describe our privacy definition, we first define the system procedures, adversary oracles and privacy experiments following the standard definitions of [10] for an RFID system. For the sake of simplicity, the reader and the server are assumed to be a single entity, which are connected through a secure channel.
System procedure.
An RFID scheme is defined by the following procedures. 
Privacy classes.
Vaudenay model introduces five privacy classes of polynomial time-bounded adversary, determined by A's access to RESULT or CORRUPT oracles. These classes are defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Adversary classes [10] It is clearly seen that the following relation holds for these classes: WEAKÂ FORWARDÂ DESTRUCTIVE ÂSTRONG.
Notion of security and privacy.
We are now ready to define security and privacy definitions of Vaudenay model. The security definition given by the model considers attacks in which the adversary aims to impersonate or forge a legitimate tag but not security against cloning and availability.
Definition 3 (Tag Authentication [10] ). An RFID system achieves tag authentication if for every strong adversary, A P , where P is a class of adversary defined in Definition 2, is at most negligible.
The privacy definition of Vaudenay is flexible and depends on the adversary classes in Definition 2, so it covers different notion of privacy. The privacy is simply based on the existence of a blinder B, which is able to simulate each tag T , and the reader R without knowing their secrets such that the adversary cannot distinguish whether it interacts with the real or simulated oracles. In the privacy game of Vaudenay's model, a set of tags, a protocol transcript and the reader participate. The adversary can interact with tags and the reader by calling polynomialbounded number of times any oracle according to his or her privacy class. The definition of the blinder is described as follows.
Definition 4 (Blinder, trivial adversary [10] 
Remark 1.
The blinder B is consistent and acts like a real reader in a way that if a protocol transcript's inputs are derived as a result of usage of oracles to B. The answer given by B to the RESULT oracle on this protocol transcript is 1. If all inputs of a protocol transcript are not derived as a result of the usage of oracles to B, then the answer given by B to the RESULT oracle on this protocol transcript depends on the appearance probability of missing inputs on protocol transcript. Besides, B keeps all its answers to the oracles used by A in its database and answers the new oracles depending on its database.
We now explicitly describe Vaudenay's privacy game by the following experiment Exp prv b A prv : Let`be a given security parameter, b 2 R f0, 1g and A prv be an adversary given in Definition 2. There are two phases in the experiment: learning phase and challenge phase. In the learning phase, R is first set with .sk R , pk R , DB/ SETUPREADER 1`Á. Both A prv and B also obtain the public key pk R . Then, A prv arbitrarily inquiries all oracles defined in Section 3. 
Definition 7 (k-Forward adversary). Let an RFID system S and a target tag T be given. Let also k be defined as a privacy level that is an integer in Z C [ f0g. k-forward adversary A has the following capabilities:
A can use any other oracles until k th CORRUPT oracle on T . A can use only CORRUPT oracle after k th CORRUPT oracle on T .
Remark 2.
For the case k D 0, A can not use COR-RUPT oracle on any tag, but A can use all oracles except CORRUPT oracle without any limitation.
Next, we are now ready to define our privacy definition according to our new adversary classes. Note that this definition is almost similar to Vaudenay's privacy game except its adversary classes. Assume that to the contrary the claim is wrong, then there exists integer k 0 such that after k 0 number of COR-RUPT oracles are applied, the privacy of the tag is violated. However, by definition, .k 0 C 1/-strong privacy implies that the tag privacy is protected until .k 0 C 1/ th COR-RUPT oracle usage. Thus, lim k!1 k-strong privacy .k 0 C 1/ strong privacy.
Definition 8 (k-Strong privacy). Let
In fact, the problem is equivalent to the classical calculus problem, which is whether or not .k 0 C 2/ < lim k!1 k. By undergraduate calculus, we know that lim k!1 k D 1, so the claim holds.
Therefore, we have lim k!1 k-strong privacy .k 0 C 1/-th strong privacy .k 0 C 2/-strong privacy subset lim k!1 k-strong privacy. This is a contradiction. Hence, the proposed claim holds.
Note that the tag's standing against any number of CORRUPT oracle usage corresponds to strong privacy in Vaudenay's model. Hence, lim k!1 , k-strong privacy in k-strong privacy for RFID authentication protocols based on PUFs S. Kardaş et al. our model corresponds to strong privacy in Vaudenay's model.
Remark 3.
Theoretically, one can claim that a tag can live forever regardless of how many times it has corrupted. However, in practice, it is impossible to create a tag standing against infinitely many number of corruptions physically. Hence, lim k!1 k-strong privacy is more plausible to define for real world. For example, if a tag lives until t th corruption, and until its destruction, it gives no clue about privacy, then for this tag, t-strong privacy is equivalent to the strong privacy. However, this t value changes tag to tag, so it is impossible to say that t-strong privacy is equivalent to strong privacy in Vaudenay's model for any t 2 fZg 1. This theoretical approach covers this need.
Moreover, one can claim that, if a tag lives until t corruption and until its destruction, it gives no clue about privacy, this tag also has p-strong privacy where p >D t. Therefore, according to this perspective, for all the tags in the system, the system satisfies lim k!1 k-strong privacy.
There can be an adversary A such that A can corrupt a target tag k times and A can interact with any oracle until its k th corruption. In such case, the system should be private. Such a privacy is not handled in Vaudenay's model; however, k-strong privacy captures this concern.
On the other hand, k-forward privacy is similarly defined if an adversary A prv is defined according to Definition 7. Hence, the new relations between our privacy classes holds as follows: 0-FORWARDÂ0-STRONG Â : : : ÂK-FORWARDÂK-STRONG.
ANALYSIS OF TWO RECENT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS IN OUR EXTENDED MODEL
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy level of two recent PUF-based authentication protocols according to our model.
The authentication protocol of Sadeghi et al.
Sadeghi et al. [1] use an ideal PUF (which corresponds to 1-PUF according to our model) in their proposed protocol. They assumed that whenever a strong adversary corrupts a tag, the adversary cannot reach to its temporary state and the structure of PUF would be destroyed. However, we assume that a PUF cannot be destroyed immediately after the first corruption. Tags may have a limited number of resistance against any strong attacks. We briefly describe their protocol, then analyze the protocol according to our model.
Let`2 N be a security parameter,˛,ˇ, , Ä be polynomial bounded in`. Let F : f0, 1g Ä f0, 1g 2˛! f0, 1gb e a pseudo-random function. Each tag T is equipped with an ideal unique PUF function P : f0, 1g ! f0, 1g Ä and stores a random state S 2 R f0, 1g . On the other hand, the reader's R database DB stores a set of records .ID,K/ for each tag in the system, where K D P.S/. The authentication protocol steps are summarized in Figure 1 .
In the protocol, R first sends a random challenge a 2 R f0, 1g˛to a tag T . Once T receives the challenge, T picks another random challenge b 2 R f0, 1g˛. Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that there are one reader R and one tag in the system (note that it is shown in [49] that a system with many tags and one reader has at most negligible advantage). First of all, we show that if adversary is not allowed to use CORRUPT oracle, then the adversary cannot distinguish R from the blinder B. Then, we show that if the adversary is allowed to use CORRUPT oracle at least once, then the adversary can distinguish R from B.
In the first case, the system runs m times by R or B. During the runs, the adversary guesses the number of t values for K and checks the corresponding guessed key values at any of previous runs. Note that both m and t are polynomially bounded in`. In order to calculate the maximum success probability, we have to consider two cases: (i) the probability that the adversary guesses the correct value of the key is t 2 Ä ; and (ii) the probability that the adversary determines whether c is correct or not is 1 1
Because the values m and t are polynomially bounded, the corresponding RFID scheme satisfies 0-strong privacy. Let the adversary apply CORRUPT oracle at least once. Then, the adversary learns the value of K. For the consecutive protocol run, after getting values of a, b and c, the adversary computes the real value of c by using a, b and K, and compares it with the given c value. The probability of distinguishing the real oracle from the blinder for only one protocol run is 1 1 2ˇ.
If the adversary observes more protocol runs, his or her success probability increases. Because the advantage is non-negligible, in fact close to 1, the system does not achieve k-strong privacy for k 1.
The authentication protocol of Kardas et al.
Kardas et al. [3] also proposed another PUF-based authentication protocol and applied it into a distance bounding protocol and showed its security enhancements. Similar to the model of Sadeghi et al., they also assumed that whenever a strong adversary corrupts a tag, the PUF in the tag is destroyed; however, the adversary can reach its volatile memory only once. Their assumptions are weaker than the adversary model of Sadeghi et al. In the following, we show that their protocol achieves 1-strong privacy according to our adversarial model. In this section, we first simplify the protocol of Kardas et al. protocol without changing the core of the protocol. Then, we analyze its privacy level in our model. The authentication protocol steps are summarized in Figure 2 .
Let F : f0, 1g` f0, 1g 2`! f0, 1g 2`b e a one-way pseudo-random function and P i : f0, 1g k ! f0, 1g`be an ideal PUF (1-PUF) function for tag T i . Each tag stores two random states G 0 1 i , G 2 i 2 R f0, 1g k . On the other hand, the reader's database DB stores a set of records
The authentication protocol is summarized in Figure 2 .
The protocol starts with R that sends a random challenge a 2 R f0, 1g˛to a tag T i . Whenever T i receives this challenge, it chooses another random challenge b 2 R f0, 1g˛. T i reconstructs the secret key K i and computes 
If a match is found, R sends the ID, otherwise sends ?. Figure 1 achieves 1-strong privacy. Proof. Let there be one tag and one reader in the system [49] . We consider two cases. In the first case, the adversary is allowed to apply CORRUPT oracle at most once in order to maximize his or her success probability. As the second case, we investigate privacy issue when the adversary is allowed to use CORRUPT oracle more than once.
Theorem 3. The RFID protocol demonstrated in
After the adversary applies the CORRUPT oracle, either the value of K or L is learned, but not both at the same time because the PUF P i is 1-PUF, which means its function is destroyed after the 1st CORRUPT oracle usage. Similar to the calculations performed in the proof of Theorem 2, if the system is run m times by blinder or the reader and the adversary guesses number of t values for the unrevealed key value (K or L). Then the maximum advantage that the adversary obtains in distinguishing the reader from the blinder is Á m . Because m and t values are polynomially bounded, then the system achieves 1-strong privacy.
If the adversary applies corrupt oracle more than once, then both K and L are revealed in the worst case scenario. Similar to the calculations performed in the proof of Theorem 2, the advantage that adversary has in order to distinguish the reader from the blinder is 1 1 2ˇ, which is non-negligible. Thus, the system does not achieve k-strong privacy for k 2.
K-STRONG PRIVATE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Let Ä be the security parameter of the system. Let P i : f0, 1gˇ! f0, 1g Â be a k-PUF of the i th legitimate prover P i where Â is polynomially bounded in Ä. Let H : f0, 1g ! f0, 1g be one-way collision resistant hash function where where is polynomially bounded in Ä. The credentials database DB of the reader R stores the following tag-related information
, 1gˇwhereˇis polynomially bounded in Ä. Our unilateral authentication protocol depicted in Figure 3 works as follows.
First of all, R generates a nonce a 2 R f0, 1g˛and sends it to T i . 
Upon receiving a, T i generates a nonce
b 2 R f0, 1gą nd computes H D H.a, b/. T i reconstructs K j D P i .G i˚j / and computes H D H K j , H ,
Security analysis
Throughout the paper, we utilize the following rule. Let B D f1, : : : , k C 1g be a set and B i D B=fig, where i 2 f1, : : : , k C 1g. When it is said that CORRUPT oracle applied by B i , we mean that the adversary captures all key values except the value of i th key K i . Moreover, throughout all proofs of this section, we assume that a tag is destructed at k th CORRUPT oracle usage. This assumption does not restricts role of the adversary whereas this assumption gives the adversary the opportunity to take advantage of performing maximum number of oracles to any tag. In the case of failure, eventually the adversary has to guess the value of K kC1 or K i 0 for the corresponding protocol run.
Thus, the success probability of
Ái
. Similarly, if the COR-RUPT oracle usage is applied by the rules of the set B j 0 , one deduces that A d obtains the same success probability. The result follows by the fact that i 0 and j 0 are chosen arbitrarily. From now on, when it is said that a tag is corrupted, it should be understood that it is corrupted by rules of B kC1 D B=fk C 1g D f1, : : : , kg.
Lemma 2. Let A d be a k-strong adversary and T t be the target tag. Then A d 's analyzing the system with many tags including T t gives him or her at most negligible advantage over his or her analyzing the system with only T t .
Proof. Assume that there are one reader and n tags in the system, where n is polynomially bounded in Ä. For every i 2 f1, : : : , ng, the reader and tag T i realize the number of m i protocol runs before k th corruption. Note that our aim is to observe the adversarial advantage difference between analyzing the systems with multiple tags and single tag. Thus, we have to figure out how much From now on, in the theorems stated in the succeeding text, we assume there are only one reader R and one tag T , target tag, in the system. Figure 3 achieves tag authentication for a k-strong adversary A k .
Theorem 4. The RFID protocol demonstrated in
Proof. Let Ä be the security parameter in the RFID system. According to Lemma 2, there are only one tag, T , and one reader, R, in the system. Note that the adversary does not need to apply CREATETAG, DRAWTAG and FREE oracles. A k can use SENDREADER. / oracle to start a protocol run either between R and T or between R and himself or herself. Furthermore, A k can use RESULT oracle polynomially bounded in Ä number of times by sending b and c values to the reader for corresponding a values, which are sent by R as a result of the usage of SENDREADER. / oracle. Moreover, A k can use SEND-TAG oracle polynomially bounded in Ä number of times to send a challenge value a to T . Besides, A k can use CORRUPT oracle at most k times, and we assume that the adversary exactly applies CORRUPT oracle k times to increase his or her chance to destroy tag authentication.
By Lemma 1, we assume that A k applies CORRUPT oracle by rules of the set B kC1 . Moreover, we us assume that A k observed the number of m 1 protocol runs between R and T , and queried SENDREADER. / oracle m 2 times to start protocol run between R and T . Furthermore, A k uses SENDTAG oracle m 3 times. Note that m 1 , m 2 , m 3 are polynomially bounded integers in Ä, and in order to increase the success probability of A k 's destroying tag authentication, we assume that in all protocol runs, occurred as a result of the aforementioned oracle usages and observation, different a values are used. Moreover, assume that SENDREADER. / oracle is used m 4 times to start protocol run between the reader and the adversary. After k th corruption, A k uses number of m 5 SENDREADER. / oracles to start protocol run between the reader and himself or herself. In each of these runs, A k receives different a values, then he or she generates a pair .b, c/, and A k sends this pair to the reader, and finally A s uses RESULT oracle for triple .a, b, c/. Assume that the adversary has y chances to impersonate the corresponding tag without using any oracle where y is polynomial bounded in Ä. Moreover, A k is allowed to prepare p i triples K kC1 , b i , c i for corresponding impersonation trial i. Note that these triples are prepared according to guesses of A k on the value of the missing key. A k checks if any of the triples is true or false based on the protocol transcripts reached so far at each impersonation round. If A k has no success at p i triples, then the adversary just guesses the values of b and c. Let us denote M D m 1 C m 2 C m 3 C m 4 C m 5 and P D maxfp 1 , : : : , p y g. Note that M and P are polynomially bounded in Ä. Let us figure out the success probability of the adversary at i th impersonation trial. The reader sends a i as a challenge to the adversary. If a i is equal to any of the a values that were used at previous successful protocol transactions observed or created by oracle usage, then with one probability, the adversary succeeds. However, the probability of realization of this scenario is at most
In case of failure, then A k checks correctness of each p i triple. However, the success probability of A k in this case is at most P iP 2
. If the adversary fails after two cases discussed earlier, then he or she guesses the values of b and c. At each trial, the success probability is 1 2 P . Thus, maximum success probability of A k at the end of y th impersonation trial is smaller than
Let us denote the aforementioned probability by B. Then,
The resulting probability is negligible because y, M and P are polynomially bounded, and˛, Â and are big enough. Thus, the system satisfies tag authentication. Figure 3 achieves k-strong privacy.
Theorem 5. The RFID protocol demonstrated in
Proof. Assume that to the contrary, the system does not satisfy k-strong privacy. Then, there exists an adversary A k , who can distinguish between the real RFID system and the system simulated by a blinder B with nonnegligible probability. By Lemma 2, we assume that there are only one tag and one reader in the system. Moreover, for simplicity and to increase the success probability of A k to destroy the privacy, we assume that the database of the reader is not updated throughout the proof. Let the system run for n times only by real RFID system or the blinder B, where n is polynomially bounded integer in Ä. In other words, all usable oracles defined in Section 3.1.2 is used at most n times. Moreover, by Lemma 1, assume that CORRUPT oracle is applied by the rules of the set B kC1 .
k-strong privacy for RFID authentication protocols based on PUFs S. Kardaş et al. There are three cases to consider. The first case is guessing of the value of K kC1 . The probability of this happening is 1 2 Â . The second case is A k to determine the correct value of c in at least one of the protocol runs. The probability of this case is 1 1 1 2 Á n . The last case is A k to guess whether the value that is produced by the RESULT oracle is correct or wrong successfully.
By contradiction assumption, because A k destroys the privacy, either one of the two probabilities given earlier is non-negligible or the probability of realization of the last case is non-negligible. However, with sufficiently large Â and values, the first two probabilities are negligible. Thus, the success probability of A k to guess whether the value that is produced by the RESULT oracle is correct or wrong is non-negligible. However, this contradicts with Theorem 4, namely, contradicts to the tag authentication.
ADAPTING OUR PROTOCOL TO READER AUTHENTICATION
The privacy definition given by Paise and Vaudenay (P-V) is based on the anonymity of the tags and unlink ability of the interactions. The privacy of an RFID scheme is broken when an adversary identifies a victim tag or links its interactions [20] . Nevertheless, Armknecht et al. defined privacy as the ability of an adversary to distinguish real oracles from the blinder B [21] . The concept of privacy in the P-V model is based on distinguishing between different tags, whereas in the model of Armknecht et al., the privacy is defined on the basis of the notion of (left-or-right) or (0-or-1) indistinguishability game. Therefore, their results on the privacy with reader authentication are different.
By using the approach in [21] , Habibi et al. claimed that the highest achievable privacy level is narrow-weak privacy with reader authentication [22] . However, in this section, we prove that it is possible to achieve k-strong privacy and reader authentication by introducing a PUF- based RFID mutual authentication protocol. This is the first attempt to provide both these security and privacy properties in the literature. For our proposed mutual authentication protocol, we first give definitions of two functions, F tag , F reader , which combine some steps of computation at tag and reader sides, respectively. These functions make our next protocol more readable. The function F tag requires two random challenges .a, b/, the initial nonce G and the number of k internal steps. F tag does the computation from step 2 to step 6 at the tag side (Figure 3) . The process is depicted in Figure 4 . F reader takes two challenges (a,b) and the secret keys of a tag K 1 , : : : , K kC1 and produces the output H. It simply does the computation from step 11 to step 14 at the reader side (Figure3). The process is depicted in Figure 5 .
Note that the notations used in the protocol are already described in Section 5. The extended mutual authentication protocol works as follows. 
Security and privacy analysis
In this section, we first prove that our protocol achieves reader authentication. Then we utilize this proof in order to prove that the protocol also provides k-strong privacy. Note that, throughout all proofs of this section, we assume that a tag is destructed at k th CORRUPT oracle usage. This assumption gives the adversary the opportunity to take advantage of performing maximum number of oracles to any tag. Figure 6 achieves reader authentication for k-strong adversary A k .
Theorem 6. The RFID protocol demonstrated in
Proof. By Lemma 2, let there be one reader, R, and one tag, T , in the system. Also, the adversary A has applied CORRUPT oracle to T k times with rules of B kC1 . Besides, A k observes the number of m 1 protocol runs between R and T . Also assume that A k applies following oracles with given number of times before authentication game as described in the succeeding text:
(1) m 1 times: No oracle usage, the adversary just watches protocol run between R and T ; In order to increase the success probability of A k , let us assume that the value of a that was sent to tag by the adversary or derived as a result of SENDREADER. / oracle is fixed. Moreover, let us assume that different b, c values are used by the adversary or the tag as a result of SENDTAG.a/ oracle usage).
Let the adversary have the number of y chances in order to impersonate the corresponding reader without using any oracle. Moreover, A k is allowed to prepare p i pairs K . If the adversary fails after two cases discussed earlier, then he or she guesses the values of d i . At this trial, the success probability is 1 2 P . Thus, maximum success probability of A k at the end of y th impersonation trial is smaller than 
Ä y
The resulting probability is negligible by the same argument because y, M and P are polynomially bounded in Ä and˛, Â and are big enough. Thus, the system achieves reader authentication.
Theorem 7.
The RFID protocol demonstrated in Figure 6 achieves both k-strong privacy and reader authentication.
Proof. Note that by Theorem 6, the system achieves reader authentication. Thus, we only need to prove k-strong privacy.
Assume that to the contrary, there exists an adversary A k who can distinguish the real RFID system and the system simulated by the blinder B. The blinder simulates the oracles as it is defined at proof of Theorem 5 except SENDREADER..b, c/, / oracle. In this case, B evaluates this oracle, and it outputs d 2 R f0, 1g . Moreover, there is one more oracle SendTag.d, , end/ simulated by B. The blinder returns no output to this oracle.
By Lemma 2, let there be one tag and one real reader in the system. Moreover, let us assume that the reader is not updated throughout the proof. Let A k apply the CORRUPT oracle k times by the rules of the set B kC1 by Lemma 1 and the system runs y times before distinguish-ability phase.
There are four cases to consider. The first case, as indicated at proof of Theorem 6, is the value of K kC1 , or the value of c is determined correctly by the adversary A k at least one protocol run by obtained information. However, the probabilities are Á y , respectively. The second case is to make A k determine the answers given from usage of RESULT oracle if true or false after receiving d SENDREADER.b, c/. Nonetheless, this is possible only if A k knows the value of K kC1 , but this can only happen with probability of 1 2 Â . The third case is that the correct value of d is determined by A k 's at least in one of the protocol runs. This probability is 1 1 1 2 Á y . The last case is the value of c or d that is guessed correctly by A k . However, the success probability is 1 2 1 . As all calculated probabilities are negligible and finite, sum of negligible numbers is negligible. Thus, we have a contradiction. Namely, A k has at most negligible
